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Adam Smith’s account of sympathy or ‘fellow feeling’ has recently become exceedingly popular. It has been used as an antecedent of the concept of simulation: understanding, or attributing mental states to, other people by means of simulating them (Gordon 1995a; Darwall 1998; Davies 1994). It has also been singled out as the first correct account of empathy (Goldie 1999, 2000, 2002; Neill 1996). Finally, to make things even more complicated, some of Smith’s examples for sympathy or ‘fellow feeling’ have been used as the earliest expression of emotional contagion (M. Smith 1995, 1998). 

The aim of the paper is to suggest a new interpretation of Smith’s concept of sympathy and point out that on this interpretation some of the contemporary uses of this concept, as a precursor of simulation and empathy, are misleading. My main claim is that Smith's concept of sympathy, unlike simulation and empathy, does not imply any correspondence between the mental states of the sympathizer and of the person she is sympathizing with. 

I  Introduction
Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy is a form of imagining being in someone else’s situation. When we sympathize with someone, what happens is the following: 

By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him. 
(Smith 1976[1759], TMS I.i.1.2)

This account has received special attention recently, partly as a result of its perceived similarity with some popular theories in contemporary philosophy of mind. It has been used as an antecedent of the concept of simulation: understanding, or attributing mental states to, other people by means of simulating them (Gordon 1995a; Darwall 1998; Davies 1994). It has also been singled out as the first correct account of empathy (Goldie 1999, 2000, 2002; Neill 1996). These contemporary uses of Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy converge into a neat and coherent picture whereby one important way of engaging with another person is simulation that is understood as a form of empathy and Adam Smith was the first philosopher who described this way of engaging with another person in a systematic manner. 

The aim of this paper is to question this neat and coherent picture of the connection between simulation, empathy and Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy and argue that while simulation and empathy presupposes a correspondence, or at least a certain degree of similarity, between the mental states of the simulator/empathizer and the person she is simulating/empathizing with, Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy does not imply any correspondence. Thus, if we want to understand what Adam Smith meant by sympathy, we have to resist its assimilation to simulation and empathy. Instead, we should focus on the simple, visceral, quasi-automatic imaginative reaction that is the common denominator between the cases Smith describes as sympathy. 

The structure of the paper is the following. In the second section, I outline what I take to be the most important contemporary uses of Adam Smith’s account of sympathy: as a precursor of the theory of simulation and as the first coherent formulation of what we mean by empathy. In the third and fourth sections, I analyze two important features of Smith’s account of sympathy. Smith claims that sympathizing with another person is imagining myself in this person’s situation. This account needs clarification at two points: (a) what is meant by ‘myself’ and (b) what is meant by ‘the other person’s situation’. I address these questions in the third and fourth sections, respectively. The conclusion of this analysis will be that Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy covers a wide variety of importantly different cases. In the fifth section, I argue that we may be able to find a common denominator between these different cases of sympathy if we reject an important assumption about Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy: namely, that it implies some kind of correspondence between the mental states of the sympathizer and of the person she is sympathizing with. But rejecting this assumption also breaks the similarity between Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy on the one hand and that of simulation and empathy on the other. I consider two possible objections to these claims in the sixth section and point out that instead of jeopardizing my account, they provide further textual evidence in its favor. 

II Simulation, empathy, sympathy

An important question in the philosophy of mind is how we attribute mental states to other people (Davies 1994; Carruthers and Smith 1996). There seem to be two options. One possibility is that we are equipped with a theory whose domain of application is constituted by other agents’ mental states. On this view, attributing a mental state to someone else is a case of applying a psychological theory. This is the theory-theory view. Another possibility is that we have the capacity to simulate other people’s mental states; that is, we are able to put ourselves in other peoples’ shoes, and go through in imagination the mental states we would go through were we really in the other person’s circumstances. The end result of such a process, namely the mental state in which the simulator finds herself, can now serve as a guide to what mental state the simulated person is in. This is the simulation view (Gordon 1995a, b; Heal 1995; Stone and Davies 1996; Goldman 1992). 

A standard way of characterizing simulation is the following: an agent A imagines herself in B’s circumstances, gets a grip on what she, A, would do (see, feel, think, and so on) and concludes that this is what he, B, would also do (see, feel, think, and so on) in these circumstances. As Gregory Currie writes: ‘I imagine myself to be in the other person's position, […] I simply note that I formed, in imagination, a certain belief, desire or decision, then attribute it to the other’ (Currie 1995:144-5).

It is not difficult to spot the similarity between Smith’s account of sympathy and the simulationist account of the attribution of mental states: both talk about imagining ourselves in someone else’s position. And, unsurprisingly, both the advocates of the simulationist theory and its opponents quote Smith not only among the antecedents of the simulation view, but sometimes even as one of its most convincing instances (see esp. Gordon 1995: 741). As Stephen Darwall says, ‘several philosophers of mind […] have recently argued that […] simulation […] is centrally involved in attributing mental states to others, much as Smith had clamed’ (Darwall 1998, p. 267; my emphasis). Or, even more explicitly, ‘contemporary work on imaginative simulation in mental-state attribution […] derives directly from Smith’ (Darwall 1999:140).  

The other important topic in contemporary philosophy of mind where Smith’s account of sympathy is widely used is the empathy literature (as it is widely assumed that empathy is a form of simulation, these two lines of reasoning are often run together, see Adams 1998; Gordon 1995a, b; but cf. Currie and Ravenscroft 2002). Smith’s account of sympathy is often taken to be the correct way of thinking not of sympathy, but of empathy. 

A quick terminological note: the term ‘empathy’ did not exist in Smith’s days. It was introduced to the English language as the translation of the German ‘Einfühlung’ in 1909.​[1]​ So Smith was not in the position to make a distinction between the two. The received wisdom is that if he had been, he would have talked about empathy and not about sympathy: the concept he really referred to was empathy – feeling with X – and not sympathy – feeling for X (see Neill 1996; Deonna 2007 for more on this distinction, but see also Sudgen 2002). 

Empathy (or, as Smith would say, sympathy) has been argued to be a version of ‘imagining from the inside XE "imagining from the inside" ’ (Darwall 1998; Gordon 1995; Walton 1990: 255, Currie 1995: 153; Wollheim XE "Wollheim"  1974: 187; Wollheim 1987: 103, 129; Neill 1996; Smith 1997; Gaut 1998; cf. Feagin 1996: 113–42). And Smith is taken to be the first person who put forward this view. 

As empathy and simulation are widely held to have similar structure (Adams 1998; Gordon 1995a, b), these considerations give us a neat and coherent picture of one way of engaging with other people. Simulation theory describes something very similar to empathy and Adam Smith was the first philosopher who gave a coherent account of this way of engaging with other people. All these three concepts have a lot to do with imagination, more precisely, with imagining from the inside. Further, if we take this general simulation-empathy-sympathy picture seriously, we may even be able to clarify what Adam Smith meant by analyzing the details of simulation and empathy 

My aim is to revise this picture at least as far as Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy is concerned. What contemporary philosophers of mind mean by simulation and empathy is not what Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy is about. Importantly, I will argue that according to the most plausible interpretation, Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy, unlike simulation and empathy, does not entail any correspondence between the mental states of the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with. 

III  What does it mean to imagine myself in someone else’s situation? 

Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy, whereby ‘by the imagination, we place ourselves in [someone else’s] situation’ (TMS I.i.1.2) is a version of imagining someone else from the inside. But what does imagining from the inside mean? 
Imagining X from the inside is a way of imagining X. But there are two different views about what this entails: 

(1)	Imagining having X’s experiences: X occurs in the content my imaginative episode, I myself may not. 
(1)	Imagining being in X’s situation: X herself does not even occur in the content of my imaginative episode.​[2]​
 
(1) has been the dominant view of ‘imagining from the inside’ (Currie 1995: 153; Neill 1996). To quote just one example, Kendall Walton’s account is a clear example of (1): when I imagine X from the inside, I imagine experiencing what I think X experiences (Walton 1990: 255, 344). 

Smith was perhaps the first philosopher who held a version of (2) (a detailed contemporary formulation of (2) is in Gaut 1999). The crucial difference from (1) is that X is not part of the content of this imaginative episode. Only I myself and X’s situation are.​[3]​ 
	Hence, if we want to explicate what this concept entails, we need to explicate what is meant by ‘I myself’ and what is meant by ‘X’s situation’. I analyze the former in this section. The latter will come in Section IV. 

The question of what (or who) is being imagined in the other person’s situation could be thought to be a problematic feature of Smith’s account. Robert Gordon argues that Smith’s account of sympathy ‘misses the distinction’ between imagining myself being in X’s situation and imagining being X in X’s situation—he conflates these two very different concepts (Gordon 1995a: 741, see also Gordon 1995b: 55). Gordon says that this is the reason why Smith’s concept of sympathy cannot give rise to a valid criterion for assessing the ‘propriety’ of other people’s actions. Whether Smith’s concept of sympathy can give rise to a valid criterion for assessing the ‘propriety’ of other people’s actions is a question I will return to in Section VI. But at this point it is enough to point out that Gordon’s charge against Smith can be supported by some discrepancies in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Although Smith’s initial characterization of sympathy is imagining being in someone else’s situation, at the end of the book, he writes:

When I console with you for the loss of your only son, in order to enter into your grief I do not consider what I, a person of such a character and profession, should suffer, if I had a son, and if that son were unfortunately to die: but I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters.
 (TMS VII.iii.1.4)
 
This passage sounds very much as if sympathy were imagining being X in X’s situation. And this seems to support Gordon’s point about the lack of clarity in The Theory of Moral Sentiments with regards to the distinction between imagining being in X’s situation and imagining being X in X’s situation. 

The distinction between imagining being in X’s situation and imagining being X in X’s situation is not new (Williams 1973; Wollheim 1973, 1974; Reynolds 1989; Velleman 1996) and this distinction is not as straightforward as it may seem (see, for example Recanati ms, pp. 22–3). One way of drawing this distinction that is prevalent in the contemporary literature is the following (see esp. Walton 1990). Imagining being in X’s situation is a form of self-imagining, whereas imagining being X in X’s situation is not. In other words, the former, but not the latter is imagining de se. 

The concept of imagining de se was introduced by Kendall Walton (see Recanati ms, for a thorough analysis): 

‘Imagining de se’ [is] a form of self-imagining characteristically described as imagining doing or experiencing something (or being a certain way), as opposed to imagining merely that one does or experiences something or possesses a certain property.
 (Walton 1990: 29; original emphasis) 

Imagining de se is a form of self-imagining: a form of imagining whereby the self, represented from a first person point of view, is part of the content of what is imagined. Walton makes it clear that the self is not imagined from a first person point of view if I imagine that I am on the beach. If I imagine being on the beach, then I do indeed imagine myself from the first person point of view (Walton 1990: 29–30.). The latter episode of imagining is imagining de se, whereas the former is not. 

This, in itself, will not keep imagining being in X’s situation and imagining being X in X’s situation apart, as neither of these two descriptions use that-clauses: both can be ‘characteristically described as imagining doing or experiencing something (or being a certain way)’.

But Walton makes it clear that although that-clauses may be good indicators of imaginings that are not de se, this is not what defines imagining de se. What defines imagining de se is the following: to imagine something de se is ‘to imagine about oneself in such a way that one cannot be unaware that it is oneself about whom one imagines’ (Walton 1990: 29). Does this help with the distinction we are trying to draw? Not really. When I imagine being X in X’s situation, do I imagine myself in such a way that I cannot be unaware that it is myself about whom I imagine? That depends on how rich a conception of ‘myself’ we are presupposing. As imagining being X in X’s situation is imagining myself being X in X’s situation (not imagining Bill being X in X’s situation), there is a sense in which I indeed I imagine myself in such a way that I cannot be unaware that it is myself about whom I imagine. So imagining being X in X’s situation may turn out to be as genuine a form of imagining de se as imagining being in X’s situation. But then what is the difference between the two? 

Imagining being X in X’s situation is a special case of imagining being X. And there is no agreement about what imagining being X entails (for some of the most important papers on this question, see Williams 1973; Wollheim 1973, 1974; Reynolds 1989; Velleman 1996). It has been argued that it does not entail an imagined identity between X and the imaginer, as identity is transitive, whereas imagining being X is supposedly different from imagining X being me (Wollheim 1973, 1974; Velleman 1996; for a dissenting view, see Walton 1990). 

The crucial question from our perspective is whether there is a difference between imagining being X and imagining being in X’s situation. If there is no difference between these two imaginative episodes, then Gordon’s distinction collapses. And David Velleman argued at length that imagining being Napoleon is just imagining being in a Napoleonic situation, for example seeing the battlefield of Austerlitz, hearing the canons, and so on (Velleman 1996, see also Williams 1973 for similar claims). In other words, for Velleman, imagining being Napoleon in Napoleon’s situation would just be imagining Austerlitz in a ‘Napoleonic first person’. Is Napoleon part of the content of this imaginative episode? In a way, he is, but our imagination is not directed at him. 

A natural way of extending Velleman’s analysis is that imagining Napoleon at Austerlitz is just imagining being in Napoleon’s situation, where Napoleon’s situation includes important elements of Napoleon’s psychological and maybe emotional situation. Thus, the difference between imagining being in X’s situation and imagining being X in X’s situation is really a difference of the way we individuate the situation we imagine ourselves in. 

In other words, another, maybe more charitable interpretation of Smith’s passage about the dead son would be to say that Smith argues that when we sympathize with someone, that is, when we imagine ourselves in her situation, her situation must include some psychological factors. And this takes us to our second point of clarification about Smith’s account of sympathy. 

It is worth recapitulating where we are in our analysis of Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy. We have seen that this concept needs clarification at two points: he talks about imagining oneself in someone else’s situation, but what does he mean (a) by ‘myself’ and (b) by ‘the other person’s situation’. In this section, I analyzed what could be meant by ‘myself’ and this question have boiled down to the question about what is meant by ‘the other person’s situation’: clarifying (a) presupposes the clarification of (b). In other words, we now have all the more reason to examine how ‘X’s situation’ is to be individuated when we talk about imagining oneself in X’s situation. 

IV What does it mean to imagine myself in the other person’s situation?

Another crucial question to ask about Smith’s account of sympathy is what we should mean by ‘X’s situation’ when talking about imagining oneself in someone else’s situation. Depending on the way we interpret this notion, we end up with very different accounts of imagining from the inside and of sympathy. 

It is important that we should not restrict X’s situation to X’s physical situation. X’s situation should also include facts about what X knows. Suppose X is attacked by someone. The experience of imagining myself in X’s situation will depend on whether X has a gun in her pocket, as this is an important element of X’s physical situation. Similarly, the experience of imagining myself in X’s situation will also depend on whether X knows something about the attacker that could be a means of defending herself (say, by blackmailing). And this is not an element in X’s physical, but psychological/epistemic situation. 

The upshot is that Smith should be interpreted as using the term ‘situation’ in a way that allows for psychological/epistemic elements in the other person’s situation. This seems to be the standard interpretation of what Smith means by ‘the other person’s situation’: ‘the other person’s situation as presented to her’. As Stephen Darwall says, ‘Smithian sympathy […] implicitly recognizes the other as having an independent perspective’ (Darwall 2004: 131). Or, more precisely:  

For Smith, when we judge an agent’s motive, we do so from the agent’s own perspective, viewing the practical situation as we imagine it to confront her in deliberation. And when we judge someone’s feeling or reaction, we do so from her patient’s perspective, viewing the situation as we imagine it to confront her as someone responding to it. Both judgments involve an implicit identification with, and thus respect for, the other as having an independent point of view. 
(Darwall 2004: 132; my emphasis. See also Fleischacker 2006: 4) 

In short, for Smith, sympathizing with someone entails imagining oneself in someone else’s psychological situation. Smith’s example about the grieving father should be interpreted accordingly. When ‘I change persons and characters’ with you (TMS VII.iii.1.4), this means that I imagine myself in your psychological situation: when I imagine being in your situation, I include facts about your person and character in the content of my imaginative episode. 

The problem with this way of interpreting Smith is that he talks a lot about instances of sympathy where this is not so. In an often quoted paragraph, Smith talks about emotional contagion: 

Persons of delicate fibres and a weak constitution of body complain, that in looking on the sores and ulcers which are exposed by beggars in the streets, they are apt to feel an itching or uneasy sensation in the correspondent part of their own bodies. The horror which they conceive at the misery of those wretches affects that particular part in themselves more than any other; because that horror arises from conceiving what they themselves would suffer, if they really were the wretches whom they are looking upon, and if that particular part in themselves was actually affected in the same miserable manner. 
(TMS I.i.1.3)

In the case of emotional contagion, the other person’s psychological situation is irrelevant. So if we imagine ourselves in the other person’s situation, this situation is unlikely to involve the other person’s psychology (see Gaut 1999; M. Smith 1995). 

To make things worse, some of Smith’s examples seem to entail that we ignore the psychological elements of the other person’s situation. When we sympathize with the lunatic or with the dead, we need to ignore the psychological elements in their situation. As he says: 
	
The poor wretch […] laughs and sings perhaps, and is altogether insensible of his own misery. The anguish which humanity feels, therefore, at the sight of such an object, cannot be the reflection of any sentiment of the sufferer. The compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation.
(TMS I.i.1.11)

The important consideration here is not that the ‘sentiment of the sufferer’ is different from ours—I will return to this point shortly. But if it is possible at all to feel sympathy towards the ‘poor wretch’, one must imagine oneself in her situation, not as actually presented to her, but as presented to her, were she to know that she is in this state. Thus, when one imagines oneself in her situation, then one needs to abstract away from the psychological elements in her situation.​[4]​ In other words, we can sympathize with people even if we know significantly more (or significantly less) about their situation than they themselves do. 

If we take examples of all three kinds in consideration, we get a very complicated picture. The situation in which we imagine ourselves is such that it (a) sometimes necessarily contains elements of the other person’s psychology, (b) sometimes necessarily excludes elements of the other person’s psychology and (c) sometimes is noncommittal about the other person’s psychology. 

Thus, the answer to our original question about how to individuate the situations we imagine ourselves in when sympathizing depends on the act of sympathizing. Smith’s concept of sympathy allows for psychological/epistemic elements in the other person’s situation, but it also allows for the lack of any such elements. 

This heterogeneity of the situations we imagine ourselves in when sympathizing could be taken to be indicative of the fact that Smith’s concept of sympathy is not a monolithic concept. It has been argued that he does not use the concept of sympathy consistently in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. James Otteson distinguishes three distinct senses in which he uses ‘sympathy’: ‘natural fellow feeling for others, pity for others, and correspondence of sentiments between two or more people’ (Otteson 2002: 17). Philippe Fontaine made further distinctions (Fontane 1997; see also Levy and Peart 2004) and Charles Griswold even talks about the ‘spectrum of sympathy’ (Griswold 1999: 87–8; Griswold 2006: 27). 

I will argue that we can find a common denominator between these seemingly diverging uses of the concept of sympathy, but in order to do so, we need to get rid of some connotations of the concept of sympathy that are mainly due to contemporary interpretations. 

The structure of my argument is the following. In order to understand what Adam Smith meant by sympathy, we need to clarify how ‘myself’ and ‘X’s situation’ is to be interpreted in ‘imagining myself in X’s situation’. And if we flesh out what is meant by these concept, then Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy covers cases of the kind (a), (b) and (c). Now, if we want to find a common denominator between these three very different kinds of cases, we have to revise Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy. More precisely, I will argue that if we reject a premise that has been taken for granted in analyzing Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy, then we may be able to do justice to Adam Smith’s intention to use sympathy in the very different cases of the kind (a), (b) and (c). This premise is that sympathy implies some kind of correspondence between the mental states of the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with. Rejecting this premise will break the neat and coherent contemporary simulation-empathy-sympathy picture I outlined in the second section. But if it gives us a better guide to what Adam Smith in fact meant by this concept, this is a sacrifice worth making.  

V Sympathy without correspondence

It is widely assumed about Smith’s concept of sympathy that it gives us reliable access to the other person’s mental states. This assumption is in the background of considering Smith to be an antecedent of the simulationist view of the attribution of mental states to others and this is also in the background of taking him to be the first philosopher who talked about what we now refer to as empathy. 

If sympathizing with someone is the same as, or at least can give rise to simulating that person, then sympathy must be a correct guide to the other person’s mental states. Simulating another person, as we have seen, is a way of attributing mental states to her. If sympathy were an unreliable guide to what mental state the other person has, it would be of no use in the attribution of mental states to others. 

The same applies in the case of considering Smith’s account of sympathy to be similar to what we mean by empathy these days. There is no consensus about what exactly the concept of empathy entails, but one point of agreement is that it entails that the empathizer is feeling with the other person: there is some kind of (not necessarily complete) symmetry between the two people’s mental states (Deonna 2007; M. Smith 1995; Neill 1996; Goldie 1999, 2002). But this can only be so if feeling empathy guarantees that we get into a state that is similar to that of the person we are empathizing with. 

I will argue against the assumption that sympathy, as Adam Smith uses the concept, gives us access to the other person’s mental states. Right after introducing the concept of sympathy, Smith gives a number of examples where sympathy does not give us access to the other person’s mental states. We sympathize with lunatics and what we feel when we do so is very different from what she feels. We sympathize with the dead and what we feel when we do so is clearly very different from what the dead feels, as she does not feel anything. And the mother who is worried for her child has some complex feeling that the child herself is incapable of. 

Smith sums up the moral of these examples in a very explicit manner: 

We sometimes feel for another, a passion of which he himself seems to be altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his case, that passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from the reality. 
(TMS I.i.1.10) 

In the examples above, there is an asymmetry between the mental states of the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with. If she were to take her imaginative episode a reason to attribute the mental state she finds herself in to the other person, as the simulationists would suggest, she would be wrong. And as there is no symmetry between the two agents, we can’t talk about empathy either. Thus, if the assumption that sympathy gives us a reliable access to other people’s mental states is rejected, Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy turns out to be very different from its contemporary uses. It turns out to be very different from simulation and from empathy as both of these two concepts presuppose some kind of similarity between the mental states of the simulator/empathizer and the other person. 

Smith uses the expression ‘illusive sympathy’ to describe our sympathy for the dead (TMS II.i.2.5). But the very idea of illusive sympathy could be thought to be problematic (Griswold 1999: 89-90). If our sympathy for the dead and the lunatic is illusive, how can we know that not all instances of sympathy are illusive? As Charles Griswold puts it: 

Is every sympathetic identification of spectator with actor an illusion, in that the spectator simply projects his or her own feelings into the situation and then attributes them to the actor? 
(Griswold 1999: 90) 

This is a crucial puzzle about Smith’s concept of sympathy and all interpretations of this concept need to provide some kind of answer. One possible response would be to say that illusive sympathy is somehow importantly different from ‘genuine’ or ‘non-illusive’ sympathy, that is, sympathy where there is correspondence between the feelings of the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with. I take it that this is what motivates the distinction Otteson makes between different senses of sympathy. Only one of the three senses he differentiates (and the most important one) is “correspondence of sentiments between two or more people” (Otteson 2002: 17). As he says: 

What happens is this. We see the misery or happiness of another, we imagine ourselves in the same situation, and a real or imagined feeling wells up in us as a result of this imaginative changing of place. We then compare what our own feelings would be if we were in the other’s situation with what his actual feelings are in his situation. If our respective feelings are commensurate, Smith says that we sympathize with that other; if they are not, we do not. Thus sympathy is correspondence between the imagined feelings of the spectator and the actual sentiments of the person primarily concerned. 
(Otteson 2002: 19; also Otteson 2000: 64)

So the strategy would be to take this notion of sympathy and use it as the genuine notion and demote ‘illusive sympathy’, sympathy without such correspondence, to a secondary status. We can draw a clear distinction between ‘illusive’ and ‘genuine’ cases of sympathy as the “correspondence between the imagined feelings of the spectator and the actual sentiments of the person primarily concerned” is absent in the former and necessarily present in the latter. A helpful analogy would be true and false beliefs. Not all instances of sympathy are ‘illusive’: some are, some are not. Just like not all beliefs are false. Same are, some are not. Those instances of sympathy where there is no correspondence between the feelings of the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with are illusive. Those where there is such correspondence are ‘genuine’. Similarly, those instances of beliefs where there is correspondence between the content of the belief and the state of affairs in the world are true. The ones where there is no such correspondence are false. 

I think that this strategy is neither independently plausible nor consistent with Smith’s text. Why should we accept that sympathy where I feel what the other person feels is more genuine than sympathy where this is not the case? Why should we suppose that correspondence between the feelings of the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with is a necessary or even an important feature of sympathy? 

The analogy with beliefs breaks down at this point. Beliefs have correctness conditions: if these conditions are satisfied, the belief is true, if they are not, it is false. Sympathy does not have correctness conditions. Feeling sympathy for the dead or for the lunatic is not incorrect or false or in any way defective. It is as genuine an instance of sympathy as those cases where there is perfect symmetry between the feelings of the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with. Illusive sympathy is not ‘defective’ sympathy in the same way as a false belief could be construed as ‘defective’ belief. Illusive sympathy is a paradigmatic case of sympathy and illusive sympathy may be stronger/more salient than non-illusive one.​[5]​ 

Importantly, Smith clearly does not want to make a distinction between the two kinds of sympathy (‘illusive’ and ‘genuine’): that is why, right after introducing the concept, he reminds us with no less than four examples that sympathy does not guarantee that there is correspondence between the feelings of the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with (see also Ashraf et al. 2005: 436). 

Thus, excluding ‘illusive’ instances of sympathy and restricting sympathy to those cases where there is correspondence between the mental states of the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with leads to an account that is both arbitrary and, more importantly, also flatly contradicts Adam Smith’s explicit intention to use this concept more broadly. 

Hence, we have good reason to suppose that Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy does not guarantee that there would be correspondence between the mental states of the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with. If this is so, then the two recent popular uses of Smith’s concept are unjustified. Smithian sympathy cannot be considered to be similar to what happens to us when we attribute mental states to other people by simulating them as nothing would guarantee that we attribute the correct mental state to others. 

And Smith’s concept of sympathy cannot be considered to be an early expression of the idea of empathy either as empathy entails some kind of similarity between the empathizer’s emotions and those of the person she empathizes with and this condition will not be met in many instances of what Smith would describe as sympathy. 

A helpful way of bringing out this point is Berys Gaut’s distinction between empathy and identification (Gaut 1999, see also Gaut 1998; and see Neill 1996 for a dissenting view on the relation between empathy and identification). In the case of empathy we actually feel what the other person feels, whereas in the case of identification we imagine feeling what the other person feels. Smith’s concept of sympathy is closer to what Gaut refers to as identification than it is to empathy (see also Sudgen 2002). 

The argument I presented in this section focuses on what Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy is not: it is not a mental state that requires correspondence between the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with. But this argument also gives us at least the sketch of a positive account of what Adam Smith meant when he talked about sympathy. 

If we encounter genuine instances of sympathy in cases (a), (b) and (c), then sympathy must be a very basic, quasi-automatic process that happens to us without any concern about whether we are ‘getting it right’ what mental state the other person is in. It is a simple imaginative process: imagining ourselves in a certain situation—the situation we take the other person to be in, which may or may not be the situation she takes herself to be in. 

Smith’s examples right after having introduced the concept of sympathy make it clear that sympathy is a visceral reaction. Here are a couple of examples:  

When we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm …    							(TMS I.i.1.3)

Persons of delicate fibres and a weak constitution of body complain, that in looking on the sores and ulcers which are exposed by beggars in the streets, they are apt to feel an itching or uneasy sensation in the correspondent part of their own bodies. 			(TMS I.i.1.3)

The mob, when they are gazing at a dancer on the slack rope, naturally writhe and twist and balance their own bodies, as they see him do, and as they feel that they themselves must do if in his situation.     (TMS I.i.1.3)


For Smith, these reactions all count as sympathy. But if they do, then sympathy can only be a visceral, quasi-automatic​[6]​ reaction of imagining ourselves in a certain situation—the situation we perceive or believe someone else to be in. 

But why should we call simple visceral reactions of this kind ‘sympathy’ at all? It may be true that when Adam Smith talked about sympathy, what he meant was this simple quasi-automatic imaginative reaction. But what does this concept have to do with our concept of sympathy?​[7]​ 

The short answer is that what Adam Smith calls ‘sympathy’ is a necessary component of what we call ‘sympathy’. The visceral imaginative reaction sometimes (but not always) gives rise to what we call sympathy: a mental state that involves some kind of correspondence between the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with. In other words, ‘sympathy’ in our sense presupposes ‘sympathy’ in Smith’s sense: the latter is a more basic state that the former is based on. 









One may object that this interpretation of sympathy, according to which sympathy has no correctness conditions and that it is not to be taken to guarantee any correspondence between the feelings of the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with, seems to flatly contradict some of the claims Smith makes. At the very beginning of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he writes: 

As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. 
(TMS I.i.1.2)

Although this sentence seems to suggest that sympathy is a reliable way of tracking other people’s emotions, it is important to note that Smith here makes a negative claim only, namely, that there is no other way of getting information about what other people feel but by sympathy. He does not make the stronger claim that sympathy (always, or even normally) gives us a reliable representation of other people’s emotions. All he says is that nothing other than sympathy could acquaint us with other people’s emotions. He does not say how reliable this acquaintance can be, but his repeated dismissal of the reliability of imagining (TMS I.iii.2.2, 8; IV.1.9) makes it even more likely that he did not think of sympathy as a reliable guide to others’ mental states.​[8]​ 





Finally, the following possible objection to the interpretation I outlined above needs to be addressed. One may worry that the most important use of Smith’s concept of sympathy, namely, its use in characterizing moral judgments, would be threatened by the interpretation given above. The worry, in short, is the following. If sympathy has no correctness conditions, how could our moral judgments, which should be correct or incorrect, be based on it? 

The first thing to note is that this is an immediate worry only if we assume, as many scholars do (for example, Tugendhat 2004: 90), that Sympathy entails judgment of propriety. But Smith has an explicit answer to this question. Judgment of propriety is a two step process, only the first step of which is sympathy: 

The approbation of propriety therefore requires, not only that we should entirely sympathize with the person who acts, but that we should perceive this perfect concord between his sentiments and our own. 
(TMS II.i.5.11)

In short, sympathy does not entail judgment of propriety. Judgment of propriety is a two step process: (a) we sympathize with the other person and (b) we ‘perceive this perfect concord between his sentiments and our own’. Step (a) does not presuppose correspondence between the mental states of the sympathizer and those of the person she is sympathizing with. The correspondence comes with step (b). 

We can have (a), that is, sympathy, without (b), that is, the perception of ‘perfect concord between his sentiments and our own’. The perception of ‘perfect concord between his sentiments and our own’ supposedly implies there actually being ‘perfect concord between his sentiments and our own’. But sympathy itself (step (a)) does not imply such ‘perfect concord’. 

This paper is not about Smith’s account of moral judgment. The reason why I need to focus on his account of moral judgment is to show that the interpretation of sympathy I outlined above is consistent with his account of ‘judgments of propriety’. Thus, I will not elaborate on what constitutes the second step of the two step process of our judgment of propriety: I will not say much about what ‘perceiving this perfect concord between his sentiments and our own’ (TMS II.i.5.11) consists in (Smith says a lot about what step (b) consists of at TMS I.i.3.1–4.10). 

For the purposes of this paper it suffices to point out that whatever the exact structure of moral judgment is, sympathy is a necessary but not sufficient constituent of it. In other words, sympathy, that is, step (a), is necessary for judgments of propriety—with the caveat Smith talks about at TMS I.i.3.3–4, namely that the sympathy in question is sometimes conditional sympathy. But it is not sufficient: we also need step (b) to form judgments of propriety. And as step (b) is the one of the two steps that requires ‘perfect concord between his sentiments and our own’, sympathy (step (a) does not necessarily imply such ‘perfect concord’. 

Here is another consideration in favor of this claim. Smith contrasts judgments of propriety with judgments of ‘merit or beneficence’ (TMS II.i.5.11). The latter can be based on ‘illusive’ as well as ‘non-illusive’ instances of sympathy. In other words, it does not presuppose that there is a correspondence between the mental states of the sympathizer and those of the person she is sympathizing with: 

[O]ur sense of merit is often founded upon one of those illusive sympathies, by which, when we bring home to ourselves the case of another, we are often affected in a manner in which the person principally concerned is incapable of being affected.  
(TMS II.i.5.11)

In other words, both judgments of propriety and our ‘sense of merit’ are based on sympathy. But it is only the former, but not the latter, that requires correspondence between the mental states of the sympathizer and those of the person she is sympathizing with. When it comes to our ‘appropriation of merit or beneficence’, in contrast, as Smith explicitly states, ‘no actual correspondence of sentiments, therefore, is here required’ (TMS II.i.5.11). 

To sum up, our ‘sense of merit’ is based on sympathy and it does not require that there is ‘actual correspondence of sentiments’ between the two agents. In other words, sympathy itself requires no such correspondence. Our judgment of propriety is also based on sympathy, but it does require that there is correspondence between the mental states of the two agents. Hence, the difference in terms of correspondence between the mental states of the two agents must be external to sympathy itself—what both ‘sense of merit’ and ‘judgment of propriety’ are based on. And this makes it clear that the correspondence between the mental states of the two agents is not a necessary attribute of sympathy.​[9]​ In short, under closer scrutiny, the role sympathy plays in Adam Smith’s moral philosophy does not only fail to constitute an objection to my proposal, but it also provides some further textual evidence in its favor.  





The aim of the paper was to suggest a new interpretation of Smith’s concept of sympathy and point out that on this interpretation some of the contemporary uses of this concept are misleading. I argued that sympathy should be interpreted as not necessarily involving ‘harmony and correspondence of the sentiments’ between the sympathizer and the other person, and that this interpretation could be made consistent with Smith’s account of moral judgment. 

In other words, we cannot use Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy to support the empathy/simulation picture of our engagement with other people. The concept of sympathy, as Adam Smith used it, denotes a much simpler mental phenomenon: a visceral imaginative reaction, which is very different from both empathy and simulation (but which may be a necessary constituent thereof).​[10]​ 

I criticized the contemporary uses of Smith’s concept of sympathy. But does this mean that Smith’s concept of sympathy has no use for our contemporary thinking? Not at all. In fact, we can learn something much more surprising if we take Adam Smith’s account of sympathy seriously: that our emotional engagement with other people is based on a very simple visceral, quasi-automatic imaginative process, which is at the centre of Smith’s analysis. And maybe the reinterpretation of Smith’s account of sympathy should help us to question the empathy/simulation framework for talking about our engagement with other people and to replace it with the analysis of the much simpler imaginative process that Smith talks about.
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^1	  The term was apparently introduced by the psychologist Edward Titchener. See Darwall (1998: 262) for details. 
^2	  This imagining episode is about myself, not about X. As a result, I will use the phrases ‘imagining being in X’s situation’ and ‘imagining myself being in X’s situation’ interchangeably in what follows.
^3	  Not all accounts of imagining from the inside fall clearly into one of the two categories I differentiated above. Gregory Currie’s account, for example, is ambiguous between (1) and (2). It is important to note that he does not talk about imagining from the inside, but about what he calls ‘secondary imagining’. Sometimes he characterizes secondary imagining in ways that correspond to (1): as imagining ‘the experience of the character’ or ‘in imagination, feeling what the character feels’ (Currie 1995: 153). Sometimes, however, he gives formulations of secondary imagining that is very similar to (2): ‘as a result of putting myself, in imagination, in the character’s position, I come to have imaginary versions of the thoughts, feelings and attitudes I would have in that situation’ (Currie 1995: 153). As these two different conceptions of secondary imagination occur on the very same page, we have good reason to suppose that he takes ‘X’s situation’ to be so broad that would make (2) collapse into (1). See also Currie (1998), and Currie and Ravenscroft (2002). 
^4	  It is important that in these cases of sympathy, we need to be aware of the other person’s situation as it is presented to her and nonetheless abstract away from it. If we are not aware of the other person’s situation at all, then we tend not to be able to sympathize with her, as Smith’s example of the lack of sympathy for the angry man shows. See TMS I.i.1.8. 
^5	  Interestingly Alfred Hitchcock made the same point: A curious person goes into somebody else’s room and begins to search through the drawers. Now, you show the person who lives in that room coming up the stairs. Then you go back to the person who is searching, and the public feels like warning him, ‘Be careful, watch out. Someone's coming up the stairs’. Therefore, even if the snooper is not a likeable character, the audience will still feel anxiety for him. Of course, when the character is attractive, as for instance Grace Kelly in Rear Window, the public’s emotion is greatly intensified.(Truffaut 1967: 21).Here the ‘sympathy’ the audience feels is ‘illusive’ as there is an important asymmetry between the mental states of the ‘snooper’ and the members of the audience: the ‘snooper’ does not know that someone is coming up the stairs, but we do. Yet, our ‘sympathy’ with her is very strong, arguably stronger than it would be if there were more correspondence between her mental states and ours (that is, if she were to know that someone is coming up the stairs or if we were to be ignorant of this fact). 
^6	  This interpretation of Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy is consistent with those recent suggestions according to which Adam Smith conceived of sympathy as a physiological reaction (see, for example Schabas 2003, esp. section 4). 
^7	  I am grateful to Sam Fleischacker for raising this question. 
^8	  Further, denying that sympathy in itself is a reliable indicator of other people’s emotions is consistent with the claim that sympathy can be a component of a mental process that reliably tracks other people’s emotions—as we shall see in the next section. An analogy would be the following. Perception is a reliable process, but one’s retinal image, a necessary component of the perceptual process, is not: the shape of our retinal image when we are looking at circular object is very rarely (only in those cases when we are looking at it head on) a reliable indicator of the actual shape of the object we are looking at. 
^9	  This conclusion may have important implications for one of the most important questions in the background of the infamous Das Adam Smith Problem (the problem about the apparent conflict between the claims of The Theory of Moral Sentiments and of the Wealth of Nations): the question about whether sympathy is a ‘motive to action’ (Broadie 2006: 164-5; see also Werhane 1991: 97; Otteson 2000: 64; Ashraf et al. 2005: 435; Raphael and Macfie 1976: 21-2; Montes 2004: 45-55; Khalil 1990; Raphael 2007: 117ff.). A crucial question about sympathy is what role it plays in our moral psychology: whether it is a ‘motive to action’. Of course whether it is depends on what we mean by ‘motive to action’, whether we interpret Smith as holding that motives must be causes and if so, what kind of causes (see Fleischacker 2004, Brown forthcoming and Otteson 2002 for overview). It is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to engage with this debate. But it is important to note that if we accept the interpretation of sympathy I proposed above, the debate may look different. On the picture I outlined here, sympathy is the first step in a two step mental process that constitutes judgments of propriety. We may or may not consider judgments of propriety to be ‘motives to action’, but even if we do, it is still debatable whether we should consider a proper part of a ‘motive to action’ (the judgment of propriety) also a ‘motive to action’. If it is true that sympathy for someone does not imply ‘harmony and correspondence of the sentiments between him and ourselves’ (TMS II.i.5.11), then a number of assumptions behind the debate about whether sympathy is a ‘motive to action’ needs to be reevaluated (see also Fleischacker 2004: 67). 
^10	  This change in the interpretation of Smith’s concept of sympathy may also help us to put in perspective some other key concepts of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, such as that of deception (see esp. TMS IV.1.10) and Smith’s emphasis on the importance of self-approbation/disapprobation (as opposed to the approbation/disapprobation of others, see esp. TMS IV.1.8). I am grateful to Margaret Schabas for drawing my attention to some of these implications of my argument. 
